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IS THE DOMESTIC TERRORISM ATTACK ON THE CAPITOL
AMERICA’S CHRISTCHURCH MOMENT ? AN OPPORTUNITY FOR
MORE CLARITY WITH THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT AND
MORE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTERNET PLATFORMS

Megan Black*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On the day that Congress counted the electoral votes to
officially declare President Joseph R. Biden the 46 th President of
the United States, Make America Great Again (“MAGA”)
supporters marched into the Capitol, destroyed and stole
property, endangered Congressmembers, and prevented the
electoral vote from proceeding, all while streaming and posting
their activity on social media.1 While these acts of domestic
terrorism captured the attention of the global community, former
President Donald Trump (“Trump”) continued to incite his
supporters via Twitter and Facebook throughout the day while
continuing to challenge the legitimacy of the voting process.2

* J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2022. Bachelor of Arts in

Communications and Public Service from the University of Pennsylvania, 2015. I
am grateful to Professor David Opderbeck for his guidance in writing, to Professor
Charles Sullivan and Professor Michael Coenen for their time discussing potential
topics, and to Hannah Teller, my comment editor, and the rest of the Journal team
for helping throughout the drafting and editing processes. I would also like to
thank my parents, sister, and friends for their support throughout this
experience.
1
See Shawn McCreesh, What the MAGA Mob at the Capitol Had to Say for
Itself, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 6, 2021), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/01/
what-the-maga-mob-at-the-capitol-had-to-say-for-itself.html; Julian Borger, Maga
Mob’s Capitol Invasion makes Trump’s Assault on Democracy Literal, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jan/06/uscapitol-trump-mob-election-democracy.
2
Brakkton Booker, House Democrats Use Trump's Own Words To Argue He
Showed No Remorse After Attack, NPR (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.npr.org/
sections/trump-impeachment-trial-live-updates/2021/02/11/967034292/housedemocrats-use-trumps-own-words-to-argue-he-showed-no-remorse-after-attack.
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Trump even released a short video asking rioters to leave. 3 In
this video, however, Trump told those on the Capitol “we love
you, you’re special” and continued to assert that he had won the
election saying, “I know your pain, I know you’re hurt. We had an
election that was stolen from us. It was a landslide election, and
everyone knows it. Especially the other side. But you have to go
home now. We have to have peace.”4 Many commentators point
to rampant evidence of the Trump administration’s aggression
and misinformation on social media platforms and accordingly
blame social media companies for not doing more to police their
platforms aside from labeling Trump’s posts.5
Contrarily, after a gunman, thought to be an Australian
white nationalist, shared a hate-filled manifesto online and used
Facebook to livestream the mass murder of fifty people at two
Mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, the Australian
government passed legislation that imposes huge fines for social
media companies and jail time for their executives if they do not
rapidly remove “abhorrent violent material” from their platform. 6
The Australian government took swift and clear action to ensure
that terrorism will not be streamed on social media without
consequences again.
Unlike Australia, U.S. Government leaders did not take any
immediate legislative steps, but social media companies took
action, banning Trump temporarily from Twitter, Facebook, and
These platforms also removed some of his
Instagram.7
8
statements. Additionally, YouTube stated that it would not
tolerate violence on its sites and claimed to remove multiple
livestreams that showed the rioters in the Capitol carrying

3
Travis Caldwell, Trump’s ‘We Love You’ to Capitol Rioters is More of the
Same, CNN (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/07/politics/trump-history-

comments-trnd/index.html.
4

Id.

Kate Conger et. al., Twitter and Facebook Lock Trump’s Accounts After
Violence on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
5

2021/01/06/technology/capitol-twitter-facebook-trump.html.
6
Damien Cave, Australia Passes Law to Punish Social Media Companies for
Violent Posts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/
world/australia/social-media-law.html.
7 Conger, supra note 5.
8 Caldwell, supra note 3.
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firearms.9 Whether it is viewed as admirable or too little, too late,
the varied and independent actions taken by social media
companies are not sufficient. Codified legal standards are
needed, initially to identify the type of content that can and
cannot remain online, and subsequently to determine the liability
of social media companies for failing to meet such initial
benchmarks. Without legislative guideposts, platforms can rely
solely on company-specific policies, which prevent individuals
from having uniform expectations about the type of material that
is acceptable on the platforms.
This is where the
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) could come into play.
The CDA, 47 U.S. Code § 230, provides legal protection
against liability for websites that have user-generated content. 10
Congress passed this act with the intention of promoting broad
Internet growth and creativity.11 Currently, the CDA provides
extensive flexibility for social media platforms to avoid
accountability for the behavior of others in the name of ensuring
the development of the Internet, modern technologies, and
online competition. The elements required for Section 230(c)
immunity are: (1) that the defendant is a provider or user of an
interactive computer service; (2) that the asserted claims treat the
defendant as the publisher or speaker of the information; and (3)
that the information is provided by another information content
provider.12 Based on how platforms evolved, the political
environment, the need for privacy, and the reliance people have
on the content posted on the platforms, Congress must establish
greater accountability for platforms.
First, this comment conducts a comparative analysis of the
Australian Sharing Abhorrent Violent Material Criminal Code
Amendment and the CDA. In comparing these laws, the
comment evaluates the context in which they arose, the intent of
the legislation, and the subsequent application of the laws. The
Australian law is the focus of comparison for the CDA because it
is a piece of recent legislation that received a number of critiques
that provide a good starting point for any proposed changes to
9
10
11
12

Conger, supra note 5.
47 U.S.C.A § 230(c).
47 U.S.C.A § 230(b).
47 U.S.C.A § 230(c).
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the CDA.
This comment then evaluates the problem with how the CDA
is operating today. It further considers newer issues that arose in
the context of online hate, such as doxing, as well as government
action in this space, including the Trump Administration’s
Executive Order about social media censorship, the Fight Online
Sex Trafficking Act (“FOSTA”), and the Stop Enabling Sex
Traffickers Act (“SESTA”).
The goal of this analysis is to highlight why there needs to be
a change in the immunity provided to online platforms. The
Internet has evolved since Congress passed the CDA, and it is
time for codified standards that articulate what online content is
unacceptable and what actions platforms need to take to avoid
liability when the content on their platform does not meet the
standards. This article concludes with potential pathways for
change to create greater liability for platforms and more
consistency for the quality of online content.
II.

BACKGROUND

Seven out of ten Americans use social media to follow the
news, share personal content, entertain themselves, and connect
with others.13 This reliance on social media for information
allows Internet platforms to shape and steer public discourse.14
When the Pew Research Center asked which platforms
respondents use on a daily basis, researchers found preferences
for the following platforms: Facebook (74%), Instagram (63%),
Snapchat (61%), YouTube (51%), and Twitter (42%).15
Despite the wide use of social media, 64% of Americans say
social media has a mostly negative effect on the country. 16
Natalie Annette Pagano, Comment, The Indecency of the Communications
Decency Act § 230: Unjust Immunity for Monstrous Social Media Platforms , 39
13

PACE L. REV. 511, 512 (2018).
14
Annemarie Bridy, Remediating Social Media: A Layer-Conscious Approach,
24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 193, 195 (2018).
15
Andrew Perrin & Monica Anderson, Share of U.S. Adults Using Social
Media, Including Facebook, is Mostly Unchanged Since 2019, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/10/share-ofu-s-adults-using-social-media-including-facebook-is-mostly-unchanged-since-2018/
(providing a breakdown of social media use by platform and demographic lines).
16 Brooke Auxier, 64% of Americans Say Social Media Have a Mostly Negative
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Notably, this view varies based on political affiliation and age,
with more young adults saying social media has a positive
impact.17 YouTube and Facebook are the most widely used
online platforms, and as a result have a broader user base that is
more representative of the American population as a whole when
compared to sites used less frequently like Twitter, Pinterest,
Instagram, and LinkedIn.18 But Instagram has a wide number of
users as well, with young adults and women most likely to say that
they use it, and there is a range of varying age groups using the
platform: 75% of adults aged 18 to 24, 57% of adults 25 to 29
years old, 47% of adults 30 to 49 years old, 23% of adults 50 to 64
years old, and 8% of adults 65 years and older.19 Instagram is not
a top media site for news, with only 14% of adults saying they get
news on the platform, similar to the number of adults who get
news from Twitter (17%); notably, Instagram and Twitter are
used significantly less for news content than Facebook (52%) and
YouTube (28%).20
A year-over-year analysis found that social media use by U.S.
adults largely did not change despite issues with privacy, fake
news, and censorship on social media.21 Facebook remains one of
the most widely used social media sites among adults in the U.S. 22
Almost seven-in-ten adults (69%) say that they use Facebook,
while 73% of adults report using YouTube, making it the only
other online platform measured that matches Facebook’s reach. 23
But other online platforms, like Instagram and Snapchat, have
cultivated larger followings with younger social media users.24
Effect on the Way Things Are Going in the U.S. Today, PEW RESEARCH CENTER

(Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/15/64-of-americanssay-social-media-have-a-mostly-negative-effect-on-the-way-things-are-going-in-theu-s-today/.
17 Auxier, supra note 16.
18
Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (April 7, 2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/Internet/fact-sheet/social-media/.
19
Brooke Auxier, 8 Facts About Americans and Instagram, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/21/8-factsabout-americans-and-instagram/.
20 Auxier, supra note 16.
21 Perrin, supra note 15.
22 Perrin, supra note 15.
23 Perrin, supra note 15.
24 Perrin, supra note 15.
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Despite the lack of trust many social media users have for the
platforms, social media is part of the daily routine of many
Americans, with roughly 70% of Facebook users and around 60%
of Instagram users visiting the platforms at least once a day. 25
Importantly, social media encompasses a broad array of online
platforms and is not limited to websites traditionally thought of
as social media like Facebook and Twitter.26 Any website that
possesses a comment section or allows for readers to respond and
thus hosts third party content could be considered social media.27
A 2019 survey from the Pew Research Center found that 55%
of Americans believe technology companies have too much
influence and power.28 Further, a majority of Americans (72%)
think that social media websites intentionally censor political
viewpoints the platform finds objectionable.29 While 66% of
Americans generally believe social media websites have a
responsibility to remove offensive content from platforms, few
Americans have confidence in the ability of the social media
company to determine which offensive content should be
removed from the platform.30 The greatest response was from
45% of Americans who decided they possessed “not too much”
confidence in the platforms, while 24% of Americans have no
confidence that the sites will adequately determine what is
offensive and thus should be removed.31 Further, almost half of
those surveyed, 48%, said it was “hard to know” what others
might perceive as offensive content that should be removed. 32
Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 12, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/Internet/fact-sheet/social-media/.
26 George Fishback, How the Wolf of Wall Street Shaped the Internet: A Review
of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 28 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 275,
280 (2020).
25

27

Id.

Carroll Doherty & Jocelyn Kiley, Americans Have Become Much Less
Positive About Tech Companies’ Impact on the U.S., PEW RESEARCH CENTER (July
28

29,
2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/29/americans-havebecome-much-less-positive-about-tech-companies-impact-on-the-u-s/.
29

Id.

John Laloggia, U.S. Public has Little Confidence in Social Media Companies
to Determine Offensive Content, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (July 11, 2019),
30

https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/11/u-s-public-has-little-confidencein-social-media-companies-to-determine-offensive-content/.
31
32

Id.
Id.
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This research indicates that even though many Americans are
comfortable using social media in their daily lives, they do not
trust the platforms to adequately monitor content. Therefore, a
nationally mandated standard is necessary.
III.

DIFFERENT APPROACHES

A. Background
1. Australia
Since Australia has more restrictive legislation that attempts
to hold social media companies accountable, it will serve as a
comparison point for how the CDA could evolve. The violent acts
in Christchurch provided a moment of reckoning for the
Australian legislature, which took the violence as an opportunity
to create mandated community norms for online content and
forced accountability on the platforms.
Prior to the passage of the Sharing of Abhorrent Violent
Material Act 2019 (“SAVMA”), which amended the criminal code,
Australia relied on inconsistent judge-made law to define the
scope of intermediary liability for third party conduct. 33 For
example, the Supreme Court of Victoria held that Google is a
publisher of search results because employees possess skill and
expertise for the purpose of creating a search engine and Google
intends its search engines to publish material on the Internet in
response to a search.34 By contrast, the Supreme Court of New
South Wales found Google is not a publisher because search
results are generated by an algorithm, rather than human
activity.35 Although the New South Wales court agreed with the
Supreme Court of Victoria that people created the algorithms, it
did not find the level of human usage to be sufficient to establish

33 Brett G. Johnson, Innovation in Media and Entertainment Law: Symposium
Article: Beyond Section 230: Liability, Free Speech, and Ethics on Global Scale
Networks, 2 BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 274, 295 (2018).

The Supreme Court of Victoria is the highest court in Victoria dealing with
the most serious civil and criminal cases within the State of Victoria. How The
SUPREME
COURT
OF
VICTORIA,
Court
Works,
https://www.supremecourt.vic.gov.au/about-the-court/how-the-court-works
(last
visited Oct. 2, 2021); Johnson, supra note 33, at 295.
35 Johnson, supra note 33, at 295.
34
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Google as a publisher.36 Further, the Supreme Court of the
Australian National Territory—located in the capital of
Canberra—found a website smaller than Google, which
encouraged users to make defamatory posts, to be a publisher
under Australian law and liable for the posts.37 Australian case
law does not establish a clear line between global intermediaries
and local small-time intermediaries for the purposes of liability.38
SAVMA matches or exceeds other democracies’ attempts to
punish multinational technology companies for third party usergenerated content.39 This legislation establishes new offenses by
criminalizing a list of “abhorrent violent material,” and creates
greater liability for platforms failing to take down content by
establishing punitive measures, such as imprisonment and fines
up to 10 percent of the company’s annual profit. 40
Australia’s Attorney General at the time, Christian Porter,
expected the act to “send a clear message that the Australian
government expects the providers of online content and hosting
services to take responsibility for the use of their platforms to
share abhorrent violent material.”41
The conversation
surrounding the legislation focused on the length of time the
Christchurch attack streamed and the length of time it took to
contain the streaming and take it down.42 Legislators also
focused on holding social media companies more accountable for
any violent material on the platforms.43 This legislation passed in
early April after the attack in mid-March with both houses
passing the legislation within 24 hours, and it received general
approval from all legislators.44

Johnson, supra note 33, at 295.
Johnson, supra note 33, at 295–96.
38 Johnson, supra note 33, at 296.
39 Cave, supra note 6.
40
See Evelyn Douek, Australia’s New Social Media Law is a Mess, LAWFARE
(Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/australias-new-social-media-lawmess#; Cave, supra note 6. Note the provisions of SAVMA will be discussed further
in General Law Provisions.
36
37

41
42
43
44

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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2. Potential European Influences
The European Union, through the European Commission,
outlined recommendations that members should take “to
effectively tackle illegal online content,” specifically advocating
for online platforms to be more responsible in content
governance along a few key metrics.45 These metrics include
creating clear “notice and action” procedures; creating efficient
tools and proactive technologies; safeguarding fundamental
rights; working with small companies; and cooperating with
authorities.46 Another potential source of inspiration is France,
which, in the wake of the attack on Charlie Hebdo magazine,
enacted sweeping legislation that curtailed freedom of movement
and expression.47 Part of this legislation allowed the French
government to block websites that “incite or glorify” terrorism
without receiving previous judicial authority.48 This need for
permission can curtail free expression while failing to adequately
address the terrorism issue that it aims to prevent.49 The
Australian regulation also follows in the footsteps of “The
German Act to Improve the Enforcement of the Law in Social
Networks” (NetzDG), which requires social media networks and
service providers to take down “manifestly unlawful” content
within 24 hours or the provider can face large fines reaching €50

45
Illegal
Content
on
Online
Platforms,
EUR.
COMM’N,
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/illegal-content-online-platforms (last
visited Oct. 2, 2021).
46

Id.

Eglantine Stauton, France, ‘Cradle of Liberty,’ Struggles to Balance AntiLaw and Rights, THE CONVERSATION (May 7, 2015),
https://theconversation.com/france-cradle-of-liberty-struggles-to-balance-antiterrorism-law-and-rights-41412; see also Dan Bilefsky & Maïa de la Baume,
Terrorists Strike Charlie Hebdo Newspaper in Paris, Leaving 12 Dead , N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/world/europe/charlie-hebdoparis-shooting.html (sharing that the terrorist attack by Muslim extremists on
Charlie Hebdo magazine left twelve people dead including editors, cartoonists, and
police men in one of the deadliest attacks in postwar France that was thought to be
inspired by magazine’s inclusion of cartoons satirizing Muslim community).
48
Press Release, Human Rights Watch, France: Counterterrorism Bill
Threatens
Rights
(Oct.
9,
2014)
(on
file
with
author),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/09/france-counterterrorism-bill-threatensrights#.
47

terrorism

49

Id.
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million.50 Both laws provide examples of limiting the types of
content shared online and attempting to punish individuals for
sharing the banned content.
3. United States of America
Congress wanted to promote free speech, self-regulation,
and the rise of Internet enterprises with the CDA.51 Congress
enacted the CDA during the early days of the Internet to protect
interactive computer service providers from civil liability for the
actions of a third party by ensuring that “no provider or user of
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher
or speaker of any information provided by another content
provider.”52
Legislators intended the CDA to encourage provider
awareness of the content featured on their services and to help
address emerging problems concerning issues with the quality of
information online and the struggles of parents to limit
children’s exposure to adult content, such as pornography.53
Specifically, the CDA made it illegal to “knowingly send to or
show minors obscene or indecent content online.”54 Congress
tacked this measure onto the Telecommunications Act, which
provided a major update to a sixty-year-old law, seemingly to
address new technological advancements like the Internet. 55
Congress also wanted to protect Internet service providers
Evelyn Douek, Germany’s Bold Gambit to Prevent Online Hate Crimes and
News
Takes
Effect,
LAWFARE
(Oct.
31,
2017),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/germanys-bold-gambit-prevent-online-hate-crimesand-fake-news-takes-effect (noting “there are exemptions for certain platforms:
nonprofits, publishing and journalism enterprising and platforms designed to
enable individual communication (such as messaging apps) or the dissemination of
specific content (such as dating websites)” as well as “networks with fewer than two
million registered German users”).
51
Michal Lavi et al., Do Platforms Kill?, 43 HARV. J. L. PUB. POL’Y 477, 511
(2020); see also 47 U.S.C.A § 230(b).
52 Orly Lobel et al., The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 144 (Nov.
2016).
53 Bridy, supra note 14, at 206–07.
54
CDA 230: Legislative History, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION: ISSUES,
https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230/legislative-history (last visited Sept. 14, 2021)
[hereinafter EFF].
50

Fake

55

Id.
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(“ISPs”) who feared liability for defamation by removing
objectionable content as a publisher under the CDA.56 Therefore,
Congress added an immunity provision as an amendment that
prevented any provider from being treated as the publisher or
speaker of third party content and excused them from liability.57
This context of protecting minors from indecent and explicit
material disappeared because the United States Supreme Court
struck down the anti-indecency sections of the CDA for violating
the First Amendment.58 The First Amendment establishes the
right to free speech, but that right is not absolute. 59
Traditionally, obscenity, which is the type of content that the
CDA aimed to prohibit, is not protected by the First
Amendment.60 However, the Court is often stuck between
impermissible obscenity and content on sexual material that is
protected by the First Amendment.61 To address this distinction,
the Supreme Court established a test in Miller v. California62 to
distinguish obscene material from sexual material protected by
the First Amendment by evaluating any potential value or offense
of the content.63 Despite this guidance, well-intended legislation
56
Mark A. Lemley, Digital Rights Management: Rationalizing Internet Safe
Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 102 (2007).
57 See Lemley, supra note 56, at 102–03; EFF, supra note 54.
58 Bridy, supra note 14, at 208; see also Reno v. Am. C.L. Union, 521 U.S. 844,

858, 881 (1997) (holding “the CDA places an unacceptably heavy burden on
protected speech,” thus making the provisions concerning Internet provider
liability for indecent and patently offensive content material unconstitutional).
59
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (establishing the First
Amendment is not absolute); see also Rebecca Jakubcin, Reno v. ACLU:
Establishing a First Amendment Level of Protection for the Internet , 9 U. FLA. J. L.
& PUB. POL’Y, 287, 288 (1998).
60
Miller, 413 U.S. at 23 (stating “obscene material is unprotected by the First
Amendment” and establishing the First Amendment is not absolute); see also
Obscenity,
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
JUSTICE:
SUBJECT
AREAS,
https://www.justice.gov/criminalceos/obscenity#:~:text=Obscenity%20is%20not%20protected%20under,obscenity
%20laws%20are%20criminal%20offenses.&text=(For%20more%20information%2C
%20see%20Citizen's,of%20obscene%20matter%20to%20minors (last visited Sept.
14, 2021).
61 61 AM. JUR. 3d. 51 Proof of Facts § 4 (2001).
62 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
63 Id. at 24 establishing the three-prong test, which states:
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary
community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest . . . (b) whether the work depicts
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can still miss the mark and result in court action against potential
First Amendment violations, as evidenced by the lawsuit
challenging the CDA.
Immediately after the Telecommunications Act was signed
into law, twenty plaintiffs filed suit against the indecency
provision, resulting in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union.64
The Court found that the anti-indecency parts of the CDA were
too vague given that they regulated the content of speech.65 The
terms “indecent” and “patently offensive” lacked a definition,
which created uncertainty around potential violations.66 Further,
the Court found that the open-ended coverage of the CDA was
unprecedented and distinct from prior decisions that upheld
limitations on indecent content when the regulation specifically
targeted commercial speech or commercial entities.67
The
Internet presented a distinct technological concern because it is
highly accessible and hosts a variety of platforms and resources.68
This distinction meant the CDA’s ambiguous restrictions
concerning obscene, offensive, or indecent material created an
overbroad standard that reached protected speech.69
The Court also concluded that the CDA, in an attempt to
prevent minors from accessing potentially harmful content,
unacceptably suppressed speech that adults have a constitutional
right to receive and address.70 In applying the test established in
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.
64 Reno v. Am. C.L. Union, 521 U.S. 844, 861 (1997).
65
Id. at 874–75 (finding that while the government has a compelling interest
in protecting children, the solution of suppressing large amount of speech is not
sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass strict scrutiny); see generally R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992) (providing more information about First Amendment
analysis while asserting the First Amendment prohibits content-based regulation of
speech unless the regulation passes strict scrutiny, meaning it is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling government interest.)
66 Reno, 521 U.S. at 871.
67 Id. at 877.
68
See Jennifer J. Lee, The Internet and First Amendment Values: Reno v.
ACLU and the Democratization of Speech in the Marketplace of Ideas, 22 COLUM.VLA J. L. & ARTS 61, 67 (1997).
69
70

See id.
Reno, 521 U.S. at 874.
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Miller, the Court found the CDA indecency provision failed

because the “vague contours” of the statute “unquestionably
silence[] some speakers whose messages would be entitled to
constitutional protection.”71
The Court also referenced
precedent establishing “[s]exual expression which is indecent but
not obscene is protected by the First Amendment.”72 The Court
only struck down the indecency provisions, leaving the immunity
provision of the Telecommunications Act intact.73 This made the
immunity provision more general than initially intended, and
platforms use that provision to avoid liability for not removing
content from their sites.74 This immunity is further expanded by
the courts because judges are more prone to decide close cases in
favor of immunity for the platform.75
Congress delineated the research findings that inspired the
creation of the CDA. First, the creation of the Internet and other
interactive computer services greatly increased the availability of
educational and informational resources to Americans.76 Second,
the services provide users with a great amount of control over the
content they consume.77 Third, these new technologies provide a
forum for diversity, development, and discourse in culture,
politics, and intellectual ideas.78 Fourth, without government
regulation, the Internet and related technologies flourished. 79
Finally, users are becoming increasingly reliant on the new
services for a number of educational, entertainment, cultural, and
political uses.80

Id. at 873–74 (finding the CDA exceeded the narrower “sexual conduct”
restraint of Miller for placing further limitations on content excluding “organs”
and “excretory activities,” and failed to account for contemporary community
standards as well as potential literary, artistic, political, or scientific value as
indicated by Miller).
72 Id. (citing Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
73 EFF, supra note 54.
74 Bridy, supra note 14, at 208.
75 Bridy, supra note 14, at 212.
76 47 U.S.C.A § 230 (a).
71

77
78
79
80

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. General Law Provisions
SAVMA sets out obligations of ISPs, content service
providers (“CSP”),81 and hosting service providers (“HSP”) when
abhorrent violent material or conduct is present on their site. 82
Abhorrent violent material is audio, visual, or audiovisual
material, that records or streams abhorrent violent conduct of
one or more persons that a reasonable person would view as
offensive.83 This material must be produced by one or more
individuals, each of whom engaged in the conduct, conspired to
engage in the conduct, aided or knowingly engaged in the
conduct, or attempted to engage in the conduct.84
It is
insignificant if the material was altered or created outside of
Australia.85 Abhorrent violent conduct includes terrorist acts,
murder, attempted murder, torture, rape, and kidnapping.86
The provider commits an offense under SAVMA for failure
to notify if abhorrent violent material or conduct appears on the
site.87 Specifically, an offense is committed if the person: (1) is an
ISP; or (2) provides a content or hosting service; and (3) is aware
that the service can be used to access abhorrent violent material
or conduct; and (4) does not submit details of the violent material
to Australian Federal Police within a reasonable time after
gaining awareness of the material’s existence.88 It is immaterial if
the content or hosting service is within or outside Australia.89
Content and service providers also face liability for failing to
remove or continuing to host the abhorrent violent material,
meaning the material must not be “accessible to any of the end81
For the purpose of a CSP, “a person does not provide a content service
merely because the person supplies a carriage service that enables material to be
accessed” and “a person does not provide a content service merely because the
person provides a billing service, or a fee collection service, in relation to a content
service.” Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent) Act 2019 (Cth)
sch 1 (Austl.).
82
83
84
85
86
87

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material) Act

2019 (Cth) sch 1 (Austl.).
88 Id.
89 Id.
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users using the service.”90 An individual commits an offense
when: (1) he provides a content or hosting service; (2) the service
can be used to access abhorrent violent material; and (3) he does
not enable the quick removal of the material from the service.91
The person is only liable for not removing abhorrent violent
material unless the material is reasonably capable of being
accessed within Australia.92 Again, it is immaterial whether the
service is provided from within or outside Australia.93 The
requisite intent for this offense is recklessness.94
Should an individual not take down the content from the
content or hosting service, the eSafety Commissioner can issue a
written notice only if a specified service could be used to access
the abhorrent violent material.95 The commissioner is not
required to observe procedural fairness to provide notice, but the
commissioner must provide a copy of the notice to the service
provider.96 If notice is provided and the prosecution proves that
the service could be used to access the material, then it must be
presumed that the person was reckless.97 But, the presumption
can be rebutted if the person shows that there was a reasonable
possibility the person was not recklessly accessing the material
when the notice was issued.98 This same presumption applies as
to whether the material is abhorrent violent material; in other
words, it is presumed when notice was given that the provider
was reckless as to the violent abhorrent material unless the
provider rebuts this presumption.99 This again applies whether
the material or platform is in or out of Australia.100
The CDA has fewer guidelines than SAVMA about what
activities are prohibited and what is required of providers. The
90
91
92
93

Id.
Id.
Id.
Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material) Act

2019 (Cth) sch 1 (Austl.).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99
Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material) Act
2019 (Cth) sch 1 (Austl.).
100 Id.
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CDA outlines the findings discussed above, policy initiatives, an
obligation concerning preventing children from accessing
obscene material, immunity for providers, and areas of law that
are not impacted by the CDA.101 The lack of clear guidelines
enabled a large amount of court interpretation defining the
scope and boundaries of the different provisions of the CDA,
which is especially true in the immunity space.102 This has led to
broad permissions unless there is a specific content type, such as
sex trafficking, that the legislation determined did not qualify for
the broad immunity.103
Court interpretation is especially
impactful for cases challenging the meaning of “publisher” under
the CDA as there is no definition within the CDA.104
The CDA outlines the policies of the U.S. when it comes to
the Internet and new technology growth and what the CDA is
trying to protect and enable. First, the CDA aims to promote the
creation and “continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media.” 105
47 U.S.C.S. § 230.
VALERIE BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10306, LIABILITY FOR CONTENT
HOSTS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE COMMUNICATION DECENCY ACT (2019).
103
Madeline Byrd & Katherine Strandburg, CDA 230 for a Smart Internet, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 405, 408–09 (2019) (“Many cases have tested the scope of
“publisher” activities, with results holding, for example, that CDA 230 immunizes
decisions about what to post; nonsubstantive editing; reformatting of fonts, colors,
and the like; and re-presentation of information in the form of star ratings or
maps.”).
104
Id., at n. 22 comparing the holdings concerning the CDA from different
circuits,
Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263,
1269–71 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (finding CDA immunity even where
Google put the advertisements into a map format); Kimzey v.
Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1269–70 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding CDA
immunity even where Yelp! took reviews from a different website
and added a star rating); O’Kroley v. Fastcase, Inc., 831 F.3d 352,
355 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding CDA immunity even where Google
had performed some “automated editorial acts on the content,
such as removing spaces and altering font” and “kept the search
result up even after [the plaintiff] complained about it”); Jones v.
Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 416 (6th Cir.
2014) (“The CDA expressly bars ‘lawsuits seeking to hold a
service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional
editorial functions such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw,
postpone or alter content.”).
105 47 U.S.C.A § 230(b)(1).
101
102
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Second, the provisions preserve the Internet’s free market by not
imposing unnecessary federal or state regulations.106 Third, the
CDA aims to promote new technology development to allow for
improved user control over the information available on the
Internet and through other interactive services.107 Fourth, the
provisions incentivize the creation and use of blocking and
filtering technologies to allow parents to restrict their child’s
access to inappropriate material online.108 Finally, the CDA
allows for the enforcement of federal criminal laws to prevent
and punish obscenity, stalking, and harassment via the
computer.109
Further, the CDA establishes that interactive computer
services providers110 have an obligation to:
at the time of entering an agreement with a
customer for the provision of interactive computer
service and in a manner deemed appropriate by
the provider, notify such customer that parental
control protections (such as computer hardware,
software, or filtering services) are commercially
available that may assist the customer in limiting
access to material that is harmful to minors. Such
notice shall identify, or provide the customer with
access to information identifying, current providers
of such protections.111
This imposes a minimal obligation on providers while offering
protection from liability, however, it has no effect on criminal
law, intellectual property law, communications privacy law, and

47 U.S.C.A § 230(b)(2).
47 U.S.C.A § 230(b)(3).
108 47 U.S.C.A § 230(b)(4).
109 47 U.S.C.A § 230(b).
110
“The term ‘interactive computer service’ means any information service,
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that
provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by
libraries or educational institutions.” 47 U.S.C.A § 230(f).
111 47 U.S.C.A § 230(d).
106
107
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sex trafficking law.112
C. Liability
Australian case law establishing the line distinguishing the
terms of liability for global intermediaries and local small-time
intermediaries is unclear.113 SAVMA matches or exceeds other
democracies’ attempts to punish multinational technology
companies for the behavior of the third party users generating
content.114 The Attorney General at the time wanted the act to
“send a clear message that the Australian government expects the
providers of online content and hosting services to take
responsibility for the use of their platforms to share abhorrent
violent material.”115
But SAVMA does offer a defense for content service
providers and hosting services if the abhorrent violent material
was accessible under certain conditions.116 For example, there is
no crime if the platform uses the violent material to help law
enforcement either enforce an Australian law or a law of a
foreign country or comply with monitoring as required by law. 117
There is also a defense if access to the violent material is
necessary for court proceedings or to advocate for a change to a
law, policy, or practice in Australian or foreign law as long as
there is a reasonable connection between the content and the
advocacy or the accessibility is necessary for the “development,
performance, exhibition or distribution, in good faith, of an
artistic work.”118 There are also exceptions if an individual is
conducting medical, scientific, academic, or historical research
and the accessibility is reasonable for the research purposes.119
Further, there is a defense if the content relates to a news or
current affairs report that is for the benefit of the public and is
112
113
114
115

47 U.S.C.A § 230(e)(1)-(2), (4)-(5).
Johnson, supra note 33, at 296.
Cave, supra note 6.
Douek, supra note 40.

Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material) Act
2019 (Cth) sch 1 (Austl.).
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
116
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made by a professional such as a journalist.120 Finally, public
officials also have a defense as long as the material is connected
to the performance of the official’s duties or functions and it is
reasonably related to the performance of the duties.121 If utilizing
one of these defenses, the defendant bears the burden of
producing evidence.122 Importantly, the defenses also extend to
matters and things outside Australia. 123 Additionally, there is no
violation of notification if the person “reasonably believes that
details of the material are already known to the Australian
Federal Police.”124 But, the burden is on the defendant to prove
the reasonableness of the belief the police already knew. 125
Compared to the approach taken by Australia and many
other countries, the CDA is considered one of the most lenient
laws because it only holds a platform liable when it “materially
contribute[d]” to the creation of the user-generated content. 126
This model gives platforms a significant degree of control over
user-generated content without making platforms take any legal
responsibility for such content.127 The Safe Harbor provision has
the effect of limiting provider liability for users’ illegal content
while containing provisions enabling providers to remove illegal
and offensive content from their platforms.128
D. Immunity/Exceptions
SAVMA does not apply to political communications,
meaning the law does not apply “to the extent . . . that it would
infringe any constitutional doctrine of implied freedom of
political communication.”129 The choice to provide immunity for
political communications could explain why the critiques of
120
121
122

Id.
Id.
Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material) Act

2019 (Cth) sch 1 (Austl.).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Johnson, supra note 33, at 302.
127 Johnson, supra note 33, at 302.
128 Bridy, supra note 14, at 206.
129
Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material) Act
2019 (Cth) sch 1 (Austl.).
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SAVMA focused on the obligations of platforms and ambiguities,
instead of the rights of users. Unlike the U.S. Constitution,
Australia’s Constitution does not explicitly provide the right to
free expression, instead, there is an implied freedom of political
communication.130 Therefore, the immunity provided seemingly
protects the freedom of expression Australians are guaranteed.
Only featuring one exception for a type of content is a
jarring difference compared to the immunity the CDA offers
platforms. The CDA “protects social media platforms from
nearly all lawsuits regarding content posted by third parties.”131
Further, the CDA’s immunity provision encourages platforms to
remove offensive material and participate as good citizens
because the platform is not liable as an editor for taking that
action.132 Immunity also “promotes free speech and e-commerce
because” providing a platform immunity nurtures the growth of
the platform.133
“‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive
material” assert that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive . . .
service” will “be treated as the publisher or speaker of . . .
information provided by another.”134 This means providers are
not liable for any action taken in good faith to restrict material
the platform values:
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or
not such material is constitutionally protected; or
any action taken to enable or make available to
information content providers or others the
technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (1).135
See Freedom of Information, Opinion and Expression, AUSTRALIAN HUM.
RIGHTS COMM’N: RTS. AND FREEDOMS, https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/rightsand-freedoms/freedom-information-opinion-and-expression (last visited Oct. 2,
2021).
131 Pagano, supra note 13, at 513.
132
Frank Fagan, Systemic Social Media Regulation, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
393, 436 (2017–2018).
133 Id. at 436.
134 47 U.S.C.A § 230(c)(1).
135 47 U.S.C.A § 230(c)(2).
130
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The immunity offered by the CDA creates a federal
immunity for any cause of action that makes ISPs liable for
information posted originally by a user of the service, meaning,
courts cannot hear claims that frame the service provider as if it
were the publisher of the content.136 This law provides immunity
in the form of civil liability to ISPs for the content third parties
post or publish on the platforms.137
The provision prevents people from taking legal action to
hold a service provider liable for exercising editorial functions,
like deciding to publish, withdraw, postpone, or change
content.138 This is often seen as a double-prong of immunity
because it immunizes the platform if it moderates content and if
it chooses not to moderate content.139 There are two rationales
for immunity.140 The first is to lower the cost of sifting through
material to determine if a platform finds negative material,
because of a fear the platform will not maintain the site if the cost
is too high.141 The second is to protect the freedom of expression
for all by preventing frivolous takedowns of content. 142
But this immunity is limited. While the CDA grants broad
immunity to websites with user-generated content, “it does not
apply to Internet sites that ‘materially contribute’” to either the
“branding or shaping” of the post or other unlawful content. 143
Courts generally utilize three criteria to determine if CDA
immunity applies to an ISP.144 Initially, courts evaluate if the
defendant is “the provider or user of an ‘interactive computer
service’” (“ICS”).145 Courts allow a variety of online platforms to
Fishback, supra note 26, at 286.
Johnson, supra note 33, at 288.
138 Fishback, supra note 26, at 286.
139 James Grimmelmann, The Virtues of Moderation, 17 YALE J. L. & TECH. 42,
103 (2015).
140 Johnson, supra note 33, at 289.
141 Johnson, supra note 33, at 289.
142 Johnson, supra note 33, at 289.
143 Lobel, supra note 52, at 145.
144
Kristine L. Gallardo, Taming the Internet Pitchfork Mob: Online Public
Shaming, the Viral Media Age, and the Communications Decency Act, 19 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 721, 736 (2017).
145 Id. at 736–37. See also 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (defining “interactive computer
service” as “any information service, system, or access software provider that
136
137
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qualify as an ICS including classified ads websites, dating
websites, and social media platforms.146 Second, the ICS must be
framed as the publisher or speaker of the content. 147 Third, the
content must be created by another user, not the ICS.148 This
generally means that an ISP is not liable for third party tortious
content unless the ISP elevates its involvement with the content;
if it does, the ISP is no longer a passive “ICS” but instead an
“information content provider” (“ICP”).149
If that shift in
involvement occurs, the ISP will not qualify for immunity.150
Unlike an ISP, an ICP is “any person or entity that is responsible,
in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other [ICS].” 151
There is an additional layer of protection aside from the
framework because courts do not see ISPs as ICPs when
“performing editorial functions, choosing to remove or add
content, or making minor adjustments to third party content.” 152
Some courts have created additional standards for
interpreting the CDA’s immunity provision. For example, the
Ninth Circuit created a test in Barnes v. Yahoo! Inc.153 that joined
together Subsection 230(e)(3) and 230(c)(1) and determined it
only protects from liability: “(1) a provider or user of an [ICS] (2)
whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of action,
as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by another
ICP.”154
Previously, the Ninth Circuit in Fair Housing Council of San
Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com155 had found that a:
provides or enables computer access . . . to the Internet and such systems operated
or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.”).
146 Gallardo, supra note 144, at 737.
147 Gallardo, supra note 144, at 737.
148 Gallardo, supra note 144, at 737.
149
Gallardo, supra note 144, at 737; see also Johnson, supra note 33, at 289
(finding immunity is not an absolute guarantee; if the intermediaries “materially
contribute” to the creation of unlawful content on the platform it loses immunity).
150 Gallardo, supra note 144, at 737.
151 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
152 Gallardo, supra note 144, at 737.
153 Barnes v. Yahoo! Inc., 507 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
154 Id. at 1100–01.
155
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521
F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2007).
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website operator can be both a service provider
and a content provider: If it passively displays
content that is created entirely by third parties,
then it is only a service provider with respect to
that content. But as to content that it creates itself,
or is “responsible, in whole or in part” for creating
or developing, the website is also a content
provider. Thus, a website may be immune from
liability for some of the content it displays to the
public but be subject to liability for other content. 156
Utilizing that standard, the court determined immunity did not
apply because Roommates.com acted as an ICP when it required
website users to answer questions.157 The court concluded that by
requiring users to fill out questionnaires, the website contributed
to the user-generated content.158
The bounds of the Roommates precedent remain unclear; it
is likely that the CDA will continue to partially shield platforms
from liability.159 A platform could face liability for other actions
such as putting branding on elicited content or creating an
interface
for conducting transactions.160
After
the
Roommates.com decision, there were many contradictory judicial
decisions as courts expressed doubts regarding the scope of
immunity.161
The Ninth Circuit is one of the only courts that has taken
action toward limiting CDA immunity for ISPs by excluding
immunity to ISPs that “materially contribute” to the content or
conduct in dispute.162 Many courts instead align with the Sixth
Circuit precedent that even if an ISP encourages or ratifies the
content of a third party, it does not forfeit CDA immunity.163 The
Id. at 1162–63.
Lobel, supra note 52, at 145–46.
158 Lobel, supra note 52, at 145–46.
159 Lobel, supra note 52, at 146.
160 Lobel, supra note 52, at 146.
161 Lavi, supra note 51, at 515.
162 Gallardo, supra note 144, at 738.
163
Gallardo, supra note 144, at 738. See also Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t
Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 417 (6th Cir. 2014).
156
157
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Sixth Circuit is not alone in this determination as courts
traditionally interpret the CDA’s immunity provision broadly,
repeatedly protecting online platforms from lawsuits.164 Another
example is Reit v. Yelp, Inc.165 where a dentist sued Yelp for
defamation and claimed that “Yelp should lose CDA immunity
because its removal of positive posts was beyond the normal
editorial function” protected.166 The New York Supreme Court
disagreed with the plaintiff, finding instead that the CDA barred
the claim because a third party supplied the information on Yelp,
and continued to say that Yelp’s selection of the posts could be
considered the selection of material for publication, an act which
is a publisher’s role.167
There has been a recent shift within the courts barring CDA
immunity when public policy weighed against a finding of
immunity or the defendant played a significant role in the
content.168 Despite this shift, as a general practice, courts
continue to err on the side of granting immunity.169
Unfortunately, even though courts’ findings of immunity are
consistent, the standards and practices they utilize to reach those
findings are not uniform.170 While the limits on the CDA are not
clear, they are essential because immunity was not intended to
create “a lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet,”171
but
inconsistent court applications and interpretations of when an
ISP becomes a content provider is starting to make immunity
look lawless.

164
165
166

Lavi, supra note 51, at 513.
Reit v. Yelp, 907 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
See Reit, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 411; Andre Jaglom, Internet Distribution, E-

Commerce and other Computer Related Issues: Current Development in Liability
Online, Business Methods Patents and Software Distribution, Licensing and
Copyright Protection Questions, ALI CLE Study Materials, 33 (June 2014).
167 Jaglom, supra note 166, at 33.
168 Jaglom, supra note 166, at 35.
169 Lavi, supra note 51, at 517.
170 Lavi, supra note 51, at 517.
171 Lavi, supra note 51, at 514.
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CRITICISMS AND CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE
IMPLEMENTATION

In enacting SAVMA, the Australian government did not seek
input from technology companies before passing the law, causing
many to worry about the free speech impact, the burden on
technology companies, and the overall effectiveness of the law. 172
This law has been critiqued by many experts in the field.
Founder of the Dangerous Speech Project at Harvard’s Berkman
Klein Center for Internet Society, Susan Benesch, fears that this
decision by Australia will lead to more dramatic responses from
platforms such as increased censorship and takedowns and
moving offices out of countries with these types of laws.173
Another critique from Sunita Bose, Managing Director of Digital
Industry Group Inc. (“DiGi”),174 is that SAVMA does not address
any of the hate speech that arose in the wake of the Christchurch
Massacre.175
Further, the legislation possesses multiple
ambiguities, such as the meaning of the terms “expeditiously”
and “in a reasonable time,” raising questions about the
effectiveness and potential legal impact and reach of the new
law.176
The United Nations (“U.N.”) Special Rapporteur on
Counterterrorism and Human Rights and Freedom of
Expression is an independent expert appointed by the United
Nations Human Rights Council who is responsible for gathering,
requesting, and exchanging information on alleged violations of
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering
terrorism.177
SAVMA’s infringement upon the ability of
individuals to share content in the name of protection from
terrorism makes the opinion of the Special Rapporteur
Cave, supra note 6.
Cave, supra note 6.
174
A non-profit industry association advocating for digital rights within
Australia with Google, Facebook, and Twitter as members. D IGI,
https://digi.org.au/about/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2021).
175 Cave, supra note 6.
176 See Douek, supra note 40.
172

173

Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN
177

RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/
terrorism/pages/srterrorismindex.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2021).
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significant because it looks to discover issues with fundamental
freedoms when preventing terrorism.178
The U.N. Special
Rapporteur critiqued the law, arguing ambiguities around
“terrorist act” and “expeditiously” threaten freedom of
expression because this lack of clarity encourages companies to
take down material if it possibly qualifies as “abhorrent violent
material.”179
Critics predicted that the vague standards and high penalties
articulated in SAVMA will cause service providers to take down
more material in an abundance of caution, which will have a
negative impact on the free speech and ideas expressed on the
platform.180 Further, it is challenging for Australia to enforce the
removal and punish platform providers.181
Despite the
enforcement obstacle, the removal requirement created by the
law applies to platforms, content services, and Internet service
providers, many of whom lack the resources required to assess
and remove content.182
Contrarily, the CDA gives platforms too much leeway to
make decisions with no accountability system in place and no
overarching guidelines. By prioritizing the protection of speech
on social media platforms, the CDA gives platforms exclusive
control over speech on the platform.183 This allows a platform to
choose either to not take down content, protect speech, and face
accusations that the platform did not do enough to prevent harm
or to remove harmful content and face accusations of censorship
or failing to protect free speech.184 Regardless of the choice
selected, platforms avoid legal liability.185 Effectively the CDA’s
Safe Harbor provision eliminated the “moderator’s dilemma,”
See Douek, supra note 40.
Douek, supra note 40.
180 Douek, supra note 40.
181
Douek, supra note 40 (stating that Mark Zuckerberg Chairman, CEO, and
controlling shareholder of Facebook refused to appear before an international
committee of lawmakers for hearings in the U.K. concerning data privacy). See also
Kelvin Chan, Global Lawmakers Grill Facebook Exec; Zuckerberg’s a No-show,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Nov.
27,
2018),
https://apnews.com/article/d471bb130d014556ac90aac3c42de1b9.
182 Douek, supra note 40.
183 Johnson, supra note 33, at 288.
184 Johnson, supra note 33, at 289.
185 Johnson, supra note 33, at 288.
178
179
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that traditionally made platforms face the choice of not
regulating content and maintaining its publisher status or
regulating content, becoming a publisher, and facing liability for
that content.186 The Safe Harbor provision did this by offering
the option to restrict access to information or to not take action
and avoid liability either way.187
One particular area where the lack of accountability harms
users is doxing. The CDA applies to doxing by creating a shield
from liability for online service providers and thus removes a
potential pathway to a doxing remedy.188 Doxing, the malicious
publication of personal information, is a form of online
harassment that causes significant real-world harm.189 Doxing
does not necessarily require a hack to access the personal
information, for example, a victim’s home address or other
information can be used to locate a subject.190 In doxing, the
aggressor moves the harassment from the Internet into the
physical world by making personal information more accessible
on the Internet, increasing the potential for harassment, injury,
or violence.191 Therefore, doxing has one foot online and one
foot in the physical world, presenting a unique challenge.
Further, victims cannot efficiently utilize the legal process
because there is no consistent remedy for doxing.192 This makes
the CDA immunity for platforms even more troubling because
victims of doxing cannot rely on the legal process to be made
whole for the tortious conduct they experienced.
Ultimately, the CDA created overbroad protection for many
companies while allowing individuals to post “without fear.” 193
CDA immunity allows platforms to avoid content regulation and
David Opderbeck, Judicial Activism Can’t Fix Section 230, BULWARK (Feb.
18, 2021, 5:47 AM), https://thebulwark.com/judicial-activism-cant-fix-section-230/.
187 Id.; see also 47 U.S.C.A § 230(c).
188
Julia M. MacAllister, The Doxing Dilemma: Seeking a Remedy for the
Malicious Publication of Personal Information , 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2451, 2468
(2017). See generally Natalia Homchick, Reaching Through the “Ghost Doxer:” An
Argument for Imposing Secondary Liability on Online Intermediaries , 76 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1307, 1315 (2019).
189 MacAllister, supra note 188, at 2453.
190 MacAllister, supra note 188, at 2457.
191 MacAllister, supra note 188, at 2457.
192 MacAllister, supra note 188, at 2457.
193 Pagano, supra note 13, at 532–33.
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liability, allowing the growth of a trillion-dollar industry for
platforms that enable user-generated content sharing.194 While
many have been concerned about the potential impact for groups
such as terrorists, human traffickers, or criminals using these
platforms, political conservatives began advocating for more
guidelines that prevent social media platforms from restricting
posts online.195
The Trump Administration took umbrage with the CDA and
even issued an executive order seeking to curtail the censorship
of certain political ideas and ideologies.196 Specifically, the order
sought to prevent the social media platforms from handpicking
content that should be excluded from the public discourse on
their platforms and engaging in what the administration referred
to as “selective censorship.”197 The order blames the CDA’s
immunity provision for the selective content removal and urges
the Secretary of Commerce and Attorney General, acting
through the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (“NTIA”), to redefine and limit the scope of the
immunity.198 Further, the order requested the NTIA file a
petition for rulemaking with the Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”) to clarify when an action is not “taken in
good faith” and the circumstances under which a provider of an
ICS cannot claim protection after restricting access to content
inconsistent with the CDA.199 But many experts found the order
misinterpreted the CDA and would actually stifle speech even
further because platforms would likely remove much of the
questionable content to avoid liability for the content. 200
Pagano, supra note 13, at 532.
Opderbeck, supra note 186.
196
Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34079 (June 2, 2020). See also Jeff
Neuburger, Commerce Dept. Petitions FCC to Issue Rules Clarifying CDA Section
230, JD SUPRA (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/commerce-deptpetitions-fcc-to-issue-50397/.
197 Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34079 (June 2, 2020). See also Jeffrey
Neuburger, Commerce Dept. Petitions FCC to Issue Rules Clarifying CDA Section
230, JD SUPRA (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/commerce-deptpetitions-fcc-to-issue-50397/.
198 Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34079 (June 2, 2020).
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Despite the miscalculation in the Executive Order, the
Trump Administration did implement two laws that limited the
immunity available under the CDA by holding websites that
hosted sexual advertisements liable for that content. In 2018,
Congress passed the House bill, FOSTA, and the Senate bill,
SESTA, the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (collectively
“FOSTA-SESTA”), which effectively curtailed the immunity
provided by the Safe Harbor in the CDA.201 These acts created an
exception to the immunity provided to platforms under the CDA
so that websites could be held accountable for ads for sex work. 202
This change was spurred by the use of Backpage, a website used
for trafficking, because when victims filed lawsuits the website was
able to hide behind the Safe Harbor provision of the CDA.203 As a
result, legislators introduced FOSTA-SESTA to narrow the
immunity afforded to platforms by making websites “liable for
any content that helped facilitate sex trafficking or prostitution”
in all circumstances.204
While the goal of these laws was to monitor websites and
provide the opportunity for sex trafficking survivors to sue their
abusers, these laws had a significant negative impact on the
consensual sex worker community.205 The restrictions conflate
consensual sex work with nonconsensual sex work and
consequently prevent consensual sex workers from sharing
information or warning each other about violent clients, thus
silicon-valley/trump-twitter-facebook-and-the-future-of-online-speech (pointing out
that without CDA liability, content such as Trump’s tweet suggesting MSNBC host
Joe Scarborough murdered member of his staff would likely be removed).
201
Liz Tung, FOSTA-SESTA was Supported to Thwart Sex Trafficking.
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it’s
Sparked
a
Movement,
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(July
10,
2020),
https://whyy.org/segments/fosta-sesta-was-supposed-to-thwart-sex-traffickinginstead-its-sparked-a-movement/. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2018); 18 U.S.C. §
2421A (2018).
202 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(e)(5); Aja Romano, A New Law Intended to Curb Sex
Trafficking Threatens the Future of the Internet as We Know It , VOX (July 2, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/culture/2018/4/13/17172762/fosta-sesta-backpage-230Internet-freedom; Glenn Kessler, Has The Sex-trafficking Law Eliminated 90
Percent
of
Sex-trafficking
Ads?,
WASH.
POST
(Aug
20,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/08/20/has-sex-trafficking-laweliminated-percent-sex-trafficking-ads/.
203 Tung, supra note 201.
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making their work even more dangerous than before the new
laws.206 Further, there is limited evidence that FOSTA-SESTA
reduced the amount of sex trafficking.207 There is not a lot of
research on the impact of the laws, but a new bill, SAFE SEX
Workers Study Act, seeks to remedy that by ordering a study of
the effectiveness of FOSTA-SESTA.208 The government claimed
the law did reduce sex trafficking ads by 90%, but by August 11,
2018, the advertising rebounded to almost 75% of the preFOSTA-SESTA rate.209 The reverberating impact of limiting
speech and harming consensual sex workers seemingly without
achieving the goals indicates that making addenda to the CDA’s
immunity provisions is not enough to ensure platforms face
liability.
Both SAVMA and the CDA highlight how legislatures are
grappling with the evolution of social media platforms. While
social media platforms started as neutral forums allowing users to
post any content, the sites evolved and now platforms monitor
and remove more messages, which requires the companies to rely
on technology, such as artificial intelligence (“AI”), to help
monitor content.210 AI has enabled platforms to take down
offensive content before it can even be flagged for some offensive
content such as child-nudity posts; but other types of content are
harder for AI to identify such as bullying or harassment posts
which typically are only removed after they are reported by
users.211 Further, there are still millions of posts and profiles to
sift through, which presents a challenge even for an AI tool. 212
For example, Twitter removed 2.9 million tweets over six months
in 2019, YouTube removed 11.4 million videos in one quarter,
206
Romano, supra note 202; Karol Markowicz, Congress’ Awful Anti-sextrafficking Law Has Only Put Sex Workers in Danger and Wasted Taxpayer Money,

BUSINESS INSIDER (July 14, 2019, 8:38 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/fostasesta-anti-sex-trafficking-law-has-been-failure-opinion-2019-7.
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116th Cong. (2020).
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and Facebook removes 17 million fake accounts each day.213 This
emphasizes that regulating platforms is a challenging task simply
due to the vast amount of posts from users.
Both SAVMA and the CDA face criticism and have
opportunities to improve. But the interesting dichotomy is that
SAVMA is critiqued for not considering the needs of platforms
and providers, while the CDA is critiqued for providing too much
freedom to platforms. This suggests there is a middle ground
available that the CDA should strive to meet with updates to the
legislation.
V.

DESIRED CDA CHANGES

The Trump Administration tried to claw back liability for
censorship purposes but missed the point—the government
should be clawing back liability for platforms more broadly. The
issue of censorship is a concern for free speech, but the more
pressing issue is that individuals damaged by third party posters
should have a means to hold platforms and intermediaries
accountable. There needs to be a balance, as an amendment to
the CDA should not be a “kneejerk reaction” to the harms social
media platforms facilitate against individuals and society. 214
Moreover, a codified consistent requirement within the CDA is
essential so that users know what content is acceptable and
platforms know they can be held accountable and how they can
avoid liability.
The first option is to amend the CDA so that there is more
accountability, obligations, and clarity around what the Good
Samaritan provision requires of content providers. This choice
supports the policy goals underlying the CDA.215 Within the
Good Samaritan provision, Congress endorsed an editorial role
for Internet services, which have grown into today’s social media
platforms.216 As the types of services provided by the Internet
have evolved, so too should the CDA.217 The varied responses by
social media platforms to Trump after the attack on the Capitol
213
214
215
216
217
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indicate that there is a greater need for consistency in acceptable
content across platforms, as well as punishment by platforms
against users. If there was a codified list of unacceptable content,
such as the definition of “abhorrent violent material” within
SAVMA, that could be a good starting point for the CDA to
ensure consistency in content quality across platforms. 218
Another approach would be to reconsider, reframe, and
redraft how platforms should act in the context of the Good
Samaritan provision.219 Adding parameters around what actions
must be taken under the Good Samaritan provision will allow for
a more effective and consistent response to information problems
such as hate speech, violent threats, harassment, doxing, and
other online abuse.220 This could be akin to SAVMA’s provisions
providing that content and hosting services must take content
down or else they will be put on notice by a government group,
which presumes that they were reckless and holds them
accountable for their failure to take down harmful content.221 By
providing more clarity about processes and procedures for
noncompliant material, the CDA can create guidelines for
platforms and boundaries for users so that the online community
can be a safer space.
To buttress those ideas, Congress should enact further
additions to the CDA framework, including notice and takedown
procedures for defamatory materials posted online, in a way that
effectively balances the CDA’s goals of promoting creative
Internet growth and addressing the needs of online attack victims
who are seeking content removal and compensation for tortious
conduct.222 This change requires platforms to “take down
offensive content once . . . notified,” and Congress could assign
the FCC the role of creating “guidelines for companies to help
determine which types of communications should be taken down”
to ensure consistency.223
218

(Austl.).
219
220
221
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While some social media companies have banned Trump as
well as accounts and hashtags affiliated with voting conspiracies
and the violence perpetrated in the wake of the election,
independent action that is not codified by the CDA can lead to
inconsistent approaches for preventing violent conduct. 224 The
inconsistent approach is already evidenced by the platforms
taking their action. For example, Twitter permanently banned
Trump’s account while YouTube implemented a strike system
requiring users to get three strikes within ninety days to receive a
permanent ban from the platform.225 If there was a clearer policy
about the type of content that would not be tolerated, like in
SAVMA, and what obligations surrounded such content, there
could be a consistent approach and a consistent ability to hold
platforms accountable for failing to comply during violent
outbreaks such as the attack on the Capitol.
Another suggestion is to amend the CDA to deny immunity
to ISPs that make editorial and publication decisions on the
theory that these entities are more than passive host sites for
third party content.226 By making editorial and publication
decisions, the ISP engages in content creation and no longer just
presents third party ideas.227 This change would be in line with
the Ninth Circuit precedent, but this alone is not sufficient to
ensure that people have greater methods for restitution when
they face online harassment.228 It is a step in the right direction,
but more is required to fully address the needed update to the
CDA, such as clear procedures for taking down posts and
guidelines for acceptable content.
Another option is to completely repeal the CDA and revert
to the use of notice-based liability for third party tortious content,
similar to the process utilized prior to the implementation of the
224 See Sara Fischer and Ashley Gold, All The Platforms That Have Banned or
Restricted Trump So Far, AXIOS, (Jan. 11, 2020), https://www.axios.com/platforms-

social-media-ban-restrict-trump-d9e44f3c-8366-4ba9-a8a1-7f3114f920f1.html.
225 Fischer supra note 224.
226 Gallardo, supra note 144, at 740.
227 Gallardo, supra note 144, at 740.
228
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC,
521 F.3d 1157, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that websites that not only passively
display content but also create or partially create or develop content may not
qualify for immunity).
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CDA.229 But this again would lead to inconsistent protection for
individuals. Despite the challenges presented by inconsistent
outcomes, a case-by-case basis could limit the benefits social
media companies receive from hateful content today because
each individual would have the unique circumstance of his case
evaluated. Another potential drawback is that a lack of immunity
protection could foster over-policing by social media platforms
and other service providers for fear of liability, which could
greatly limit free speech online.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While the Internet today has greatly evolved from the
Internet that existed when the CDA was first enacted, the CDA
needs to face its own evolution. By codifying regulations that
create consistent parameters across hosting and content service
providers and explain (1) the type of content that must be
removed; (2) the timeline for when it must happen; and (3) the
repercussions for not complying, the CDA can take the guesswork
and self-regulation away from technology companies. This
change could provide consistent regulation for platforms and a
clear pathway of relief for victims of online harassment and hate.
SAVMA is a great example of defining content, creating
parameters, and establishing repercussions, but the CDA can
build upon that and provide greater clarity and detail to avoid
the mistakes of ambiguity within SAVMA. The punitive response
by social media companies to Trump’s promotion of fake news
about the election and the reverberating impacts indicate that
now is a good time for all stakeholders to discuss a solution that is
not only manageable for platforms but also sufficiently protects
users. It is time that the protections promulgated on a case-bycase basis are codified to allow for consistent application of
community norms and rules protecting both free speech and
victims of online hate.

229

Gallardo, supra note 144, at 740.

